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TRANS., INC.; GURVEER CAB CO.; HARRY DILLION 
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O P I N I O N 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Philadelphia taxicab drivers, aggrieved by the influx of 
taxis hailed at the touch of an app on one’s phone, brought 
this antitrust action to protest the entry of Appellee Uber 
Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) into the Philadelphia taxicab 
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market. The Philadelphia Taxi Association (“PTA”), along 
with 80 individual taxicab companies (collectively, 
“Appellants”), appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their 
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging one count of 
attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and seeking injunctive relief and treble 
damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.   
 
Appellants urge us to reverse the District Court’s 
Order, contending that Uber violated the antitrust laws 
because its entry into the Philadelphia taxicab market was 
illegal, predatory, and led to a sharp drop in the value of 
taxicab medallions as well as a loss of profits. They contend 
that this is evidence that Uber’s operation in Philadelphia was 
anticompetitive and caused them to suffer an antitrust injury. 
However, the conduct they allege falls short of the conduct 
that would constitute an attempted monopoly in contravention 
of the antitrust laws. Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the SAC for failure to state a claim for attempted 
monopolization and failure to state an antitrust injury.  
I. Background & Procedural History1 
From March of 2005 to October of 2014, taxicabs 
operating in Philadelphia were required to have a medallion 
and a certificate of public convenience, issued by the 
Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”). Medallions are 
property, and are often pledged as collateral to borrow funds 
to finance the purchase of the cab or to “upgrade and improve 
                                                 
1 As this appeal arises from the grant of a motion to dismiss, 
the factual allegations set forth below are taken from the SAC 
and are accepted as true. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & 
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 642 n.1 (2008). 
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the operations of taxicabs.” 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 5712(a). Once 
medallion-holders comply with the obligatory standards for 
taxicabs, they may obtain a certificate of public convenience. 
Those standards, which provide for safety and uniformity 
among taxicabs, require vehicles to be insured and in proper 
condition, and mandate that drivers are paid the prevailing 
minimum wage, are proficient in English, and have the 
appropriate drivers’ licenses. 
 
As alleged in the SAC, when the medallion system 
was mandated in Philadelphia in 2005, a medallion was worth 
only $65,000. In October of 2014, there were approximately 
500 taxicab companies in Philadelphia. Together, 7,000 
drivers held 1610 medallions, each valued at an average of 
$545,000. 
 
Appellants are 80 of those 500 companies, which 
collectively hold 240 of the 1610 medallions, as well as PTA, 
which was incorporated to advance the legal interests of its 
members—the 80 individual medallion taxicab companies. 
Uber began operating in Philadelphia in October of 
2014 without securing medallions or certificates of public 
convenience for its vehicles. While a potential rider can avail 
himself of a medallion taxicab by calling a dispatcher or 
hailing an available cab, to use Uber, he can download the 
Uber application onto his mobile phone and request that the 
vehicle come to his location, wherever he is. Passengers enter 
payment information, which is retained by Uber and 
automatically processed at the end of each ride. Uber does not 
own or assume legal responsibility for the vehicles or their 
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operation, nor does it hire the drivers as its employees.2 Uber 
did not pay fines to the PPA or comply with its regulations 
when it first entered the Philadelphia taxi market, as is 
otherwise required for medallion taxicabs. Appellants 
maintain that this rendered Uber’s operation illegal, and 
enabled the company to cut operating costs considerably.  
 
In October of 2016, the Pennsylvania state legislature 
passed a law approving Uber’s operation in Philadelphia, 
under the authority of the PPA. The law, which went into 
effect in November of 2016, allows the PPA to regulate both 
medallion taxicab companies and Transportation Network 
Companies (“TNCs”)—a classification that includes Uber 
and other vehicle-for-hire companies that operate through 
digital apps—in Philadelphia. TNCs must now obtain licenses 
to operate and comply with certain requirements, including 
insurance obligations and safety standards for drivers and 
vehicles. The law also exempts TNCs from disclosing the 
number of drivers or vehicles operating in the city, and allows 
TNCs to set their own fares, unlike medallion taxicab 
companies, which comply with established rates, minimum 
wages, and have a limited number of vehicles and medallions 
operating at once in Philadelphia. 
 
Before this law passed, in Uber’s first two years in 
Philadelphia, nearly 1200 medallion taxicab drivers left their 
respective companies and began to drive for Uber. In those 
                                                 
2 We are aware that the issue of whether drivers can be 
classified as employees or independent contractors is the 
subject of ongoing litigation. See, e.g., Razak v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., No. 16-cv-573, 2017 WL 4052417 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 
2017).   
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two years, there were 1700 Uber drivers and vehicles 
operating in Philadelphia, serving over 700,000 riders, for 
more than one million trips. Simultaneously, medallion taxi 
rides reduced by about 30 percent, and thus Appellants 
experienced a 30 percent decrease in earnings. The value of 
each medallion dropped significantly, to approximately 
$80,000 in November of 2016. Fifteen percent of medallions 
have been confiscated by the lenders due to default by 
drivers. 
 
The PTA and 75 individual taxicab companies filed a 
Complaint, alleging three counts: attempted monopolization 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, tortious interference 
with contract under Pennsylvania law, and unfair competition 
under Pennsylvania law. Uber moved to dismiss the 
Complaint.  
 
Appellants, the PTA and now 80 individual taxicab 
companies, then filed an Amended Complaint, alleging the 
same three counts. Uber moved to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint. The District Court granted the dismissal, without 
prejudice. The District Court noted that Plaintiffs alleged 
merely harm to their business after Uber entered the 
Philadelphia taxicab market, and that Plaintiffs pointed to 
Uber’s supposed illegal participation in the taxicab market as 
evidence of attempted monopolization. However, the District 
Court concluded that these harms are “not the type of injuries 
that antitrust laws were intended to prevent, and thus do not 
establish antitrust standing.” Phila. Taxi Ass’n, Inc. v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 389, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2016). The 
Court also dismissed the state law claims, for failure to plead 
the proper elements of an unfair competition or a tortious 
interference claim.  
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Appellants then filed the SAC, alleging one count of 
attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and seeking treble damages under Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act. Uber responded with a Motion to Dismiss, 
which the District Court granted, with prejudice. Phila. Taxi 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 5515953 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 20, 2017). The District Court held that Appellants, in 
spite of multiple opportunities for amendment, had pled no 
antitrust injury sufficient for antitrust standing, and were 
unlikely to cure the lack of standing with any amendments to 
the SAC. The Court also held that the PTA could not satisfy 
the requirements for associational standing because the 
association’s members lacked standing to sue on their own. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the Sherman 
Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 15 
U.S.C. § 4.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
exercise plenary review of the District Court’s dismissal of 
the SAC, In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2017), and may affirm the judgment below on any basis 
that is supported by the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011). We accept as true the factual 
allegations in the complaint, and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. W. Penn Allegheny Health 
Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 
III. Discussion 
Competition is at the heart of the antitrust laws; it is 
only anticompetitive conduct, or “a competition-
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reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior,” that 
antitrust laws seek to curtail. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990). “[I]t is inimical to 
the antitrust laws to award damages for losses stemming from 
continued competition.” Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 
Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1986) (alternations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). This comports with the principle 
underlying antitrust laws: to protect competition, not 
competitors. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 320 (1962). 
 
If the challenged conduct has an effect on “prices, 
quantity or quality of goods or services,” Mathews v. 
Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 641 (3d Cir. 1996), we 
will find a violation of antitrust laws only when that effect 
harms the market, and thereby harms the consumer.  
 
Anticompetitive conduct is the hallmark of an antitrust 
claim. An allegation of anticompetitive conduct is necessary 
both to: (1) state a claim for attempted monopolization; and 
(2) aver that a private plaintiff has suffered an antitrust injury. 
Appellants’ SAC, however, is deficient in averring conduct 
that is, in fact, anticompetitive.  
While our caselaw is unresolved regarding which to 
address first—an antitrust violation or an antitrust injury3—
                                                 
3 Compare, e.g., Matthews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 
624, 639–41 (3d Cir. 1996) (first holding that plaintiff had 
failed to state a claim for attempted monopolization, and then 
concluding that plaintiff had also failed to allege an antitrust 
injury), with, e.g., Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 
F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 1999) (assuming the allegation of 
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we need not resolve that here, because Appellants’ claim fails 
on both counts. We begin by discussing how Appellants’ 
allegations in the SAC fall short of demonstrating 
anticompetitive conduct, and thus fail to state a claim for 
attempted monopolization,4 and then discuss how in the 
alternative, Appellants fail to allege antitrust injury to have 
antitrust standing. For both reasons, we affirm the judgment 
of the District Court dismissing the SAC with prejudice. 
 
 
 
A. Attempted Monopolization 
To prevail on a claim under Sherman Act Section 2 for 
attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that 
the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.” Mylan 
Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 
                                                                                                             
defendant’s anticompetitive motive and then concluding that 
the plaintiff had adequately alleged an antitrust injury).  
4 Because the District Court found that Appellants had not 
alleged an antitrust injury to have standing, the Court did not 
reach the underlying attempted monopolization claim. 
Appellants nevertheless raised the issue on appeal, and 
because we may affirm the dismissal of the SAC on any basis 
that is supported by the record, Murray, 650 F.3d at 247, we 
will address this issue.  
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433 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm 
Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2007)). Moreover, to survive 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the claim must be 
“plausible on its face,” allowing us to “draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
Liability hinges on whether valid business reasons, as part of 
the ordinary competitive process, can explain the defendant’s 
actions that resulted in a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power. See Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 
838 F.3d 354, 393 (3d Cir. 2016).  
 
In the SAC, Appellants allege that Uber: (1) flooded 
the market with non-medallion taxicabs, entered the market 
illegally without purchasing medallions, operated at a lower 
cost by failing to comply with statutory requirements and 
regulations, and lured away drivers from Individual Plaintiffs, 
which allegedly impaired the competitive market for 
medallion taxicabs; (2) knew of PPA’s regulatory jurisdiction 
over vehicles for hire, purposefully ignored or avoided the 
regulations and rulings of the Court of Common Pleas, and 
thereby excluded rivals from competing in the taxicab 
market; and (3) is dangerously close to achieving monopoly 
power with its market share and by operating in an unfair 
playing field with the “financial ability” to be the only market 
player and to destroy competitors’ business. SAC ¶ 83. 
Appellants also complain that the new legislation authorizing 
the TNCs’ operation would facilitate the creation of an illegal 
monopoly. 
 
We find that the SAC fails to plausibly allege any of 
the three elements of an attempted monopolization claim. 
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1. Anticompetitive Conduct 
Allegations of purportedly anticompetitive conduct are 
meritless if those acts would cause no deleterious effect on 
competition. This is where the SAC falters: Appellants set 
forth a litany of ways in which Uber’s entry into the market 
has harmed Appellants’ business and their investment in 
medallions; yet none of the allegations demonstrate a harmful 
effect on competition.  
 
To determine whether conduct is anticompetitive, 
“courts must look to the monopolist’s conduct taken as a 
whole rather than considering each aspect in isolation.” 
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003) (en 
banc). 
 
Here, Appellants claim that Uber inundated the 
Philadelphia taxicab market illegally with their non-medallion 
vehicles. They contend that Uber’s entry into the market was 
predatory because it failed to comply with statutory and 
regulatory requirements, failed to purchase medallions, failed 
to pay drivers a minimum wage, and failed to obtain the 
proper insurance, among other actions. All of these actions, 
Appellants assert, enabled Uber to operate at a significantly 
lower cost than the medallion companies, and thereby acquire 
a stronghold in the Philadelphia taxicab market. 
 
Appellants also maintain that Uber “flooded” the 
Philadelphia taxicab market by improperly luring drivers 
away from medallion companies, including Individual 
Plaintiffs. Appellants cite Uber’s practice of sending 
representatives to 30th Street Station and the Philadelphia 
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International Airport, where medallion taxicab drivers often 
congregate, to disseminate information about its services and 
to recruit potential drivers. They argue that Uber promised 
new drivers financial inducements, such as reimbursements 
for the cost of gasoline, as an incentive to leave their 
medallion companies and instead drive for Uber.  
 
 Considering the averments regarding Uber’s conduct 
in their totality, Uber’s elimination of medallion taxicab 
competition did not constitute anticompetitive conduct 
violative of the antitrust laws.  
 
First, inundating the Philadelphia taxicab market with 
Uber vehicles, even if it served to eliminate competitors, was 
not anticompetitive. Rather, this bolstered competition by 
offering customers lower prices, more available taxicabs, and 
a high-tech alternative to the customary method of hailing 
taxicabs and paying for rides. It is well established that lower 
prices, as long as they are not predatory, 5 benefit 
consumers—“regardless of how those prices are set.” Atl. 
Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340. “Cutting prices in order to increase 
business often is the very essence of competition.” Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 592 
(1986). Thus, lost business alone cannot be deemed a 
                                                 
5 To allege predatory pricing, a plaintiff must first 
demonstrate that prices are set below costs, and that the 
competitor had a dangerous probability of recouping those 
lost profits after it had driven other competitors out of the 
market. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993). Appellants have not 
alleged predatory pricing in this case. 
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consequence of “anticompetitive” acts by the defendant. See 
Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 337.  
 
Second, Uber’s ability to operate at a lower cost is not 
anticompetitive. Running a business with greater economic 
efficiency is to be encouraged, because that often translates to 
enhanced competition among market players, better products, 
and lower prices for consumers. Even if Uber were able to cut 
costs by allegedly violating PPA regulations, Appellants 
cannot use the antitrust laws to hold Uber liable for these 
violations absent proof of anticompetitive conduct. Even 
unlawful conduct is “of no concern to the antitrust laws” 
unless it produces an anticompetitive effect. Brunswick Corp. 
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977).  
 
Finally, hiring rivals may be anticompetitive, but only 
in certain cases. For example, if rival employees were hired in 
an attempt to exclude competitors from the market for some 
basis other than efficiency or merit, such as to acquire 
monopoly power or to merely deny the employees to the 
rival, this could violate the antitrust laws if injurious to the 
rival and to competition at large. W. Penn, 627 F.3d at 109 
(citing cases).  
However, Appellants acknowledge that the nearly 
1200 medallion taxicab drivers that Uber recruited did not 
remain idle, but rather they drove for Uber. In sum, what 
Appellants allege does not give rise to an inference of 
anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct and suggests, if 
anything, that Uber’s ability to attract these drivers was due to 
its cost efficiency and competitive advantage.  
 
Thus, the SAC is devoid of allegations of truly 
anticompetitive conduct. 
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2. Specific Intent to Monopolize 
Appellants allege specific intent to monopolize from 
Uber’s knowledge that the PPA maintained regulatory 
authority over vehicles-for-hire, and its choice to avoid 
regulation by being a TNC that neither owned vehicles nor 
employed drivers. They also point to Uber’s alleged willful 
disregard of the rulings of the Court of Common Pleas. 
Appellants’ claim, in essence, is that Uber’s knowledge that 
their operation was illegal reveals a specific intent to 
monopolize. 
 
“[I]n a traditional § 2 claim, a plaintiff would have to 
point to specific, egregious conduct that evinced a predatory 
motivation and a specific intent to monopolize.” Avaya, 838 
F.3d at 406 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 
U.S. 447, 456 (1993)).  
 
Some courts have inferred specific intent from 
anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct, Advo, Inc. v. 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 
1995), for instance, when business conduct is “not related to 
any apparent efficiency.” Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 n.39 (1985) 
(quoting R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 157 (1978)) 
(alterations omitted); see also 4 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 805d, (4th ed. 2017) (discussing 
how some courts “would find for the plaintiff only if the 
defendant’s acts were not motivated by ‘reasonable’ or 
‘legitimate’ business purposes”). 
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While Uber’s alleged conduct might have formed the 
basis of a regulatory violation, its knowledge of existing 
regulations alone cannot reasonably be said to demonstrate 
specific intent to monopolize. Further, Uber’s choice to 
distinguish itself from other vehicles-for-hire, eschewing 
medallions in favor of independent drivers who operate their 
own cars at will, can instead be reasonably viewed as 
“predominantly motivated by legitimate business aims.” 
Times Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 
627 (1953). Appellants have not averred any other motive. 
The allegations suggest that these business choices allowed 
Uber to operate more efficiently, and to offer a service that 
consumers find attractive, thus enabling it to acquire a share 
of the Philadelphia taxicab market.  
 
Thus, Uber’s alleged competitive strategy of creating a 
vehicle-for-hire business model, presumably to acquire 
customers, does not reflect specific intent to monopolize. 
Accordingly, Appellants have failed to allege specific intent 
on Uber’s part. 
 
 
3. Dangerous Probability of Achieving Monopoly Power 
 We held in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. that 
because the dangerous probability standard is a complex and 
“fact-intensive” inquiry, courts “typically should not resolve 
this question at the pleading stage ‘unless it is clear on the 
face of the complaint that the “dangerous probability” 
standard cannot be met as a matter of law.’” 501 F.3d at 318–
17 
 
19 (quoting Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 
877 (3d Cir.1995)).  
 
We may consider factors such as “significant market 
share coupled with anticompetitive practices, barriers to 
entry, the strength of competition, the probable development 
of the industry, and the elasticity of consumer demand” to 
determine whether dangerous probability was alleged in the 
pleadings. Id. Entry barriers include “regulatory requirements, 
high capital costs, or technological obstacles[] that prevent 
new competition from entering a market.” Id. at 307 (citations 
omitted). “No single factor is dispositive.” Id. at 318. 
 
Appellants argue that Uber has a dangerous probability 
of achieving monopoly power because it has pushed 
numerous competitors out of the market. As discussed, 
however, the SAC fails to allege anticompetitive practices by 
Uber. Nor does the SAC mention Uber’s market share; it 
merely suggests that Uber and medallion taxicabs had similar 
numbers of vehicles operating in Philadelphia as of October 
2016. This allegation falls short of indicating Uber’s market 
share in the context of all the competitors in the Philadelphia 
taxicab market, such as other TNCs.  
 
Similarly, the SAC makes no allegation of current 
barriers to entry or weak competition from other market 
participants. Appellants make the bold allegation that Uber 
holds the power to raise barriers to entry in the market, 
without any factual support. In fact, the SAC alleges that 
Uber was readily able to enter the Philadelphia market. 
“[E]asy entry—particularly historical evidence of entry—is 
even more significant in the attempt case than in 
monopolization cases generally.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, ¶ 
18 
 
807a.6 Surely other competitors, such as Lyft, are able to 
enter without difficulty, as well. 
 
Nor does the SAC describe any potentially harmful 
industry developments. It only vaguely claims that Uber may 
be able to drive out competition and raise entry barriers. 
Appellants assert in the SAC that once Uber becomes the 
dominant competitor, it would be able to charge higher prices, 
and consumers who do not own smartphones would be 
deprived of the ability to hail taxis on the street. Absent any 
allegations of a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power, this argument fails. And, as counsel for Uber stated at 
oral argument, if Uber raised its prices, this would encourage 
other rivals to enter the market and charge lower prices, 
battling Uber through price competition.  
 
Because the elements of attempted monopolization are 
often interdependent, proof of one element may provide 
“permissible inferences” of other elements. Broadcom, 501 
F.3d at 318 (quoting Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 978 
F.2d 98, 112 (3d Cir.1992)). Even so, none of the other 
elements of attempted monopolization allow us to infer a 
dangerous probability that Uber will achieve monopoly 
                                                 
6 Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that in an attempt case, 
when “the defendant is not yet a monopolist,” market prices 
are more competitive. ¶ 807g. On the other hand, “[i]n a 
monopolization case the defendant is already a dominant firm 
and the market already presumably exhibits monopoly prices 
that have not been effectively disciplined by new entry.” Id. 
Thus, easy entry into the market is indicative that the market 
lacks barriers to entry that may otherwise protect a dominant 
firm’s monopoly power. Id. 
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power. Acknowledging Broadcom’s reticence to resolve the 
dangerous probability question at the pleadings stage, we 
nevertheless find that the SAC does not allege any of the 
relevant factors to prove that Uber had a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power. 
 
In sum, Appellants have failed to set forth a plausible 
claim of attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, as a matter of law. 
 
III. Antitrust Standing 
Alternatively, Appellants’ antitrust claim fails for lack 
of antitrust standing, which is a threshold requirement in any 
antitrust case. Rooted in prudential principles, antitrust 
standing is distinct from Article III standing, which is rooted 
in the Constitution. Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott Labs., 707 
F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 2013).7 While “[h]arm to 
the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the 
constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact,” courts 
must also consider “whether the plaintiff is a proper party to 
bring a private antitrust action.” Associated Gen. Contractors 
of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 535 n.31 (1983); see also Areeda & Hovenkamp, ¶ 335. 
 
                                                 
7 Because antitrust standing is prudential, we are not bound to 
address it first, because it “does not affect the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court, as Article III standing does.” 
Ethypharm, 707 F.3d at 232. 
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Of the requirements for antitrust standing,8 antitrust 
injury is “a necessary but insufficient condition,” and is the 
only requirement in dispute here. Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., the 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that antitrust injury could 
be alleged by a private plaintiff averring that it would have 
fared better without the defendant’s alleged conduct. 429 U.S. 
477. Rather, the plaintiff must prove the existence of an 
antitrust injury, which is an “injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Id. at 489; see also Alberta 
Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 826 
F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that to establish 
antitrust injury, “plaintiffs must prove more than harm 
causally linked to an illegal presence in the market”). The 
injury must “reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the 
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the 
                                                 
8 The test for antitrust standing is: “(1) the causal connection 
between the antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff 
and the intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) whether the 
plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust 
laws were intended to provide redress; (3) the directness of 
the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might produce speculative 
claims; (4) the existence of more direct victims of the alleged 
antitrust violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment of damages.” Ethypharm, 
707 F.3d at 232–33 (quoting In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165–66 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
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violation.” W. Penn, 627 F.3d at 101 (quoting Brunswick, 429 
U.S. at 489). 
 
Compensating plaintiffs injured by the effects of truly 
anticompetitive conduct serves the purpose of antitrust laws, 
namely, to foster competition. Thus, the antitrust injury 
requirement ensures that damages are only awarded for losses 
that “correspond[] to the rationale for finding a violation of 
the antitrust laws in the first place.” Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 
342; Areeda & Hovenkamp, ¶ 337a. That is, there must be a 
causal link between the alleged injury and an antitrust 
violation’s anticompetitive effects. 
 
Appellants decry Uber’s entry into Philadelphia as a 
campaign to inflict economic harm and to cause Appellants to 
lose their market share. They argue that all vehicles-for-hire 
legally operating in Philadelphia, and the riding public, have 
been harmed by Uber’s allegedly illegal presence in 
Philadelphia between October of 2014 and October of 2016, 
when TNCs were officially permitted to operate. Appellants 
allege that they experienced financial harm and a reduced 
market share through fewer drivers, medallion cabs sitting 
idle, a decline in ridership, and loss of medallion value. The 
effect of the decrease in earnings, Appellants argue, is that 
taxicab companies are nearing default on their medallions and 
are close to being driven out of business. 
 
Appellants allege their own injury, namely, financial 
hardship. Tellingly, they fail to aver an antitrust injury, such 
as a negative impact on consumers or to competition in 
general, let alone any link between this impact and the harms 
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Appellants have suffered.9 Perhaps this is because Appellants 
cannot do so. According to Appellants’ own pleadings, 
Uber’s entry into the Philadelphia market, regardless of its 
legality, increased the number of vehicles-for-hire available 
to consumers and product differentiation in the market, 
thereby increasing competition.  
 
The facts of Brunswick illustrate this point. There, a 
bowling equipment manufacturer acquired several failing 
bowling alleys that had defaulted on their equipment 
payments. 429 U.S. at 479–80. Three active bowling alleys 
brought an antitrust claim against the manufacturer, arguing 
that if the alleys had been allowed to fail, former patrons 
would have frequented plaintiffs’ alleys, increasing plaintiffs’ 
profits and market share. Id. at 481. 
 
The Supreme Court held that even if the acquisition 
was unlawful because it provided the manufacturer with 
monopoly power, the plaintiffs failed to prove that there were 
anticompetitive effects of that acquisition in order to establish 
an antitrust injury. Id. at 487–88. Plaintiffs sought to recover 
lost profits from bolstered competition—the manufacturer’s 
keeping the defaulting alleys in business. Id. The presence of 
more bowling alleys resulted in more competition, and thus 
the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not sustained an 
antitrust injury. Id. at 489.10 
                                                 
9 Appellants allege the potential detriment to consumers in the 
event that medallion taxicabs are driven out of the market, 
entirely. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 62. Yet they fail to aver any facts 
suggesting that this is an imminent, realistic possibility. 
10 See also Areeda & Hovenkamp, ¶ 337 (“At its most 
fundamental level, the antitrust injury requirement precludes 
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Similarly here, Appellants urge the application of 
antitrust laws for the express opposite purpose of antitrust 
laws: to compensate for their loss of profits due to increased 
competition from Uber. However, harm to Appellants’ 
business does not equal harm to competition. “Conduct that 
merely harms competitors, . . . while not harming the 
competitive process itself, is not anticompetitive.” Broadcom, 
501 F.3d at 308. Were we to award Appellants antitrust 
damages to compensate for their financial injuries, we would 
condemn vigorous competition, rather than encourage it. See 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 84 
(3d Cir. 1973).  
 
Without demonstrating a harmful effect on price, such 
as predatory or monopoly pricing, Appellants instead argue 
that Uber’s ability to operate at a lower cost caused 
Appellants economic harm and caused Appellants to lose 
their market share. But Appellants never argue that the lower 
cost—evidence of increased competition—failed to result in 
lower prices for consumers. “A plaintiff who wants . . . less 
competition or higher prices, that would injure consumers, 
does not suffer antitrust injury.” U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas 
Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). 
Nor do Appellants aver a negative effect on the 
availability of taxicab services. Appellants themselves admit 
that Uber’s 1700 vehicles took over 700,000 riders on more 
than one million trips in its first two years in Philadelphia, 
while the number of medallion cabs allegedly decreased by at 
                                                                                                             
any recovery for losses resulting from competition, even 
though [in Brunswick] such competition was actually caused 
by conduct violating the antitrust laws.”). 
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least 15 percent, or roughly 240 vehicles, from its peak of 
1610. Thus, the SAC alleges an increase in the availability of 
vehicles-for-hire for Philadelphia passengers. 
 
Appellants also insist that Uber’s alleged illegal 
presence in Philadelphia caused an antitrust violation.11 They 
attempt to circumvent the antitrust injury requirement by 
focusing on how Uber’s purportedly illegal operation enabled 
it to cut costs and increase its market share. But again, the 
Supreme Court has squarely rejected illegal conduct as a basis 
for antitrust injury. A competitor’s illegal presence in a 
market is not a per se antitrust violation, and any resulting 
injury is alone insufficient for a private plaintiff to state an 
antitrust injury. Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 334 (quoting 
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).  
 
Finally, Appellants do not cite any case in support of 
the contention that Uber’s violation of state regulations, even 
if that gave Uber a competitive advantage, renders its 
operation in violation of antitrust laws. Even if we were to 
find Uber’s operation in Philadelphia unlawful in its first two 
years, we would do so under PPA regulations, and not under 
antitrust laws. Ultimately, Uber’s presence in the market, as 
alleged, created more competition for medallion taxicabs, not 
less, and thus Uber’s so-called “predation”—operating 
without medallions or certificates of public convenience—
does not give rise to an antitrust injury.  
 
                                                 
11 “The antitrust injury in this case is the anticompetitive 
effect made possible by the violation of the laws and 
regulations in place at the time.” SAC ¶ 75. 
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In sum, we affirm the dismissal of the SAC for the 
additional reason that it fails to assert an antitrust injury.  
 
IV. Associational Standing 
To have associational standing, the PTA must meet 
three requirements: “(1) the organization’s members must 
have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests the 
organization seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and 
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 
individual participation by its members.” Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 279 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Pa. Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 163 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  
 
The District Court concluded that the PTA failed the 
first requirement of associational standing that the Supreme 
Court articulated in Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), because 
the Individual Plaintiffs lack standing to sue on their own in 
light of their failure to aver an antitrust injury.  
 
However, as we discussed in Section III, supra, Article 
III standing is a constitutional requirement, separate from 
antitrust standing, and Article III standing could be satisfied if 
a plaintiff presents a “case or controversy.” United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 
517 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1996). 
Here, the Individual Plaintiffs do have Article III 
standing by virtue of their alleged competitive injury in the 
taxicab market, such that the PTA satisfies the first 
requirement, and could plausibly meet the other two 
requirements, for associational standing. However, even if the 
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PTA has associational standing, they do not have antitrust 
standing in order to maintain an antitrust cause of action. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Appellants may have been better off, financially, if 
Uber had not entered the Philadelphia taxicab market. 
However, Appellants have no right to exclude competitors 
from the taxicab market, even if those new entrants failed to 
obtain medallions or certificates of public convenience. See 
Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 597 
(7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J.), cert. denied sub nom. Ill. Transp. 
Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 1829 (2017). 
 
If medallion taxicabs could prevent TNCs from 
entering the Philadelphia market, and if incumbents could 
prevent new entrants or new technologies from competing 
because they fear loss of profits, then “economic progress 
might grind to a halt.” Id. at 596–97. “Instead of taxis we 
might have horse and buggies; instead of the telephone, the 
telegraph; instead of computers, slide rules.” Id. at 597. 
 
Absent any allegations of anticompetitive conduct, 
Appellants fail to allege any of the elements for a claim for 
attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and fail to allege antitrust standing.  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
